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COPY NO. *CD/ED*
OCI NO. 9427/55

1 December 1955

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



DOCUMENT NO. **3**
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☐ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S **01989**
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH. **7-26-79**
DATE: **7-26-79** REVIEWER: ☐ 25X1

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THE WEEK IN BRIEF

PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

THE BULGANIN-KHRUSHCHEV TRIP Page 1

As Khrushchev and Bulganin are continuing their trip through South Asia, First Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko and other members of the Soviet entourage are meeting with high Indian officials on specific plans for Soviet economic assistance to India. [REDACTED]

FRENCH ELECTION CRISIS Page 3

Before French president Coty acts on the Faure cabinet's decision to dissolve the National Assembly, the premier's opponents will make a desperate effort to revise the electoral law. They may also try to oust him by a motion of censure in order to prevent his heading a caretaker government. President Coty may delay announcement of dissolution in order to avoid elections until after the holiday season. If elections are held under the present law, the Communists will probably strengthen their representation in the assembly. [REDACTED]

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EAST GERMANY ASSERTS SOVEREIGNTY
OVER EAST BERLIN Page 4

East Germany has used its detention of several American officials for driving a radiotelephone-equipped car in East Berlin as the occasion to assert its sovereignty over East Berlin and has indicated that it intends to restrict Allied access to this part of the divided city. The assertion on 29 November by General Dibrova, the Soviet commandant in Berlin, that East Berlin is an integral part of the German Democratic Republic may put an end for all practical purposes to the exercise of quadripartite rights in East Berlin. [REDACTED]

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THE SITUATION ON CYPRUS Page 5

The intensified violence on Cyprus which followed London's declaration of a state of emergency in the colony on 26 November underscores the determination of Nationalist extremists to continue their campaign until Britain offers an explicit concession on self-determination. The terrorist organization EOKA on 25 November issued a call for "retribution in blood" for the vigorous British campaign of repression, and Archbishop Makarios told the American consul in Nicosia he believed that London would soon be forced to give Cyprus an unconditional guarantee of self-determination. [REDACTED]

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ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION Page 6

Charges and countercharges of border violations have been made by Israel, Egypt and Jordan during the past week. The clashes have been minor, but the accumulation of incidents could result in an Israeli reprisal raid against Egypt or Jordan.

[REDACTED]

AFGHANISTAN Page 7

The "resignation" of Afghanistan's anti-Soviet minister of national defense is further evidence that Prime Minister Daud is successfully consolidating his position and orienting Afghan policy toward closer relations with the USSR. There is a possibility that three other pro-Western cabinet ministers will also be removed shortly.

[REDACTED]

PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTS

French North Africa: Rivalry between the two principal nationalist parties, the Istiqlal and the Shoura, may delay the formation of a Moroccan government. Berber tribes are continuing to make forays in the vicinity of the Spanish-Moroccan border. Parts of Algeria are suffering from severe economic difficulties, the result of a disruption of business activities caused by rebel attacks. In Tunisia, the activities of extremist nationalist Salah Ben Youssef are a problem for the government.

[REDACTED]

Page 1

Indonesians to Elect Constituent Assembly: Indonesians on 15 December will elect 520 delegates to a constituent assembly which will draft a permanent constitution to supersede the present provisional instrument. The show of party strength in the forthcoming elections is not likely to differ much from that of the parliamentary elections last September, which resulted in four major parties each drawing from 20 to 25 percent of the vote.

Page 2

Viet Minh Food Problem: For the past three crop seasons, agricultural yields in North Vietnam have been well below those anticipated by the government, and recent statements by the Viet Minh indicate that grain production for 1955 will fall considerably short of standing requirements. The food shortage is likely to become even more acute during the first few months of 1956, prior to the spring harvest, and the Viet Minh will then require additional assistance from Communist China and the USSR.

[REDACTED] Page 3

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Yugoslav-Satellite Relations Show Improvement: Yugoslavia's relations with the European Satellites have improved gradually since Khrushchev's visit to Belgrade last May. There are long-standing obstacles to the establishment of close relations. [] Page 5

East German Security Service Reorganized: The reorganization of the East German security service, announced on 27 November, was undertaken to strengthen the control apparatus in the face of increased unrest and dissidence and to meet the added responsibilities of East German border and internal control functions turned over by the Soviet forces. [] Page 6

Brazil: The regime of Acting President Nereu Ramos, brought to power in War Minister Lott's "preventive coup" of 11 November, appears stable and primarily concerned with avoiding further cleavage in the armed forces and ensuring the inauguration in January of President-elect Juscelino Kubitschek. [] Page 7 25X1

PART III**PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES**

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE Page 1

Soviet foreign policy at this juncture suggests that Moscow will continue to follow the basic post-Stalin policy of seeking at least a limited detente between the USSR and the Western powers. This policy is primarily a device for reducing international tension rather than an instrument for an early negotiated settlement of the major political issues dividing the power blocs. The Soviet leaders apparently believe that they hold the initiative in the political-diplomatic duel with the West which they envisage as continuing indefinitely against the background of the recognition implicit in the

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summit conference that, confronted by a relative balance of nuclear capabilities, neither the USSR nor the United States can afford to resort to general war as an instrument of policy. The Russians appear confident that this situation has deprived the West of any possibility of negotiating from strength or imposing on the Sino-Soviet bloc a settlement of the cold war on Western terms. [REDACTED]

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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SUDAN Page 6

There is no longer much doubt that the Sudan will choose independence rather than union with Egypt, but the details of how the Sudanese will make their choice have not been finally decided. While there is no definite timetable, the Sudan should formally achieve independence by the end of 1956. Sudanese politicians, meanwhile, have begun to jockey for position, with Prime Minister Azhari striving to maintain a hold on his post. [REDACTED]

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PART IV

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PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

THE BULGANIN-KHRUSHCHEV TRIP

India

Bulganin and Khrushchev are conducting an intensive campaign to sell Russian friendship to the Indian people. They have taken advantage of every opportunity to put across the following ideas:

(1) India can make the same tremendous and rapid strides the USSR has made in economic development without Western help and in the face of capitalist hostility;

(2) the colonial powers responsible for the long suppression of Asia still stand in the way of peace by forming military blocs and operating from a "position of strength"; and

(3) Soviet possession of nuclear weapons is the major deterrent to aggressive action by the United States leading to another world war.

The Soviet leaders have also emphasized that Indian and Soviet interests coincide on such major points as the "five principles," Communist China's place in the world community, and opposition to SEATO and to such vestiges of colonialism as Goa.

Indian reaction to Soviet blandishments has been mixed so far, ranging from applause for Soviet offers of economic and technical assistance to irritation over the Russian discourtesy in criticizing the Western powers while in India.

The USSR's Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko and Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Kумыkin are at present engaged in conferences with high officials of the Indian Foreign, Commerce, and Natural Resources Ministries. The American embassy in New Delhi has reported that these talks apparently center on the possible use by India of Soviet technical and scientific personnel, and perhaps touch on possible Soviet help in the broader field of economic development for India's second Five-Year Plan.

A high Foreign Ministry official indicated to Ambassador Cooper on 21 November that India will probably accept some Soviet aid because of its urgent need for foreign economic and technical assistance to ensure fulfillment of its second Five-Year Plan.

The Soviet army newspaper Red Star reported on 26 November that II Soviet institutes are participating in drawing up plans for a new technological institute in Bombay, claiming that participation of Soviet specialists will contribute to strengthening cultural relations between the two countries. According to the Foreign Ministry official mentioned above, however, the Indian government does not wish to accept from the Soviet Union a technical co-operation program similar to that of the United States, though the USSR has suggested that this be done. The final policy decisions in connection with the trip will probably be made when Bulganin and Khrushchev return to New Delhi after their tour of Burma.


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The Indian government has followed some elements of the Indian press in reacting unfavorably to the Russians' use of their visit to spread criticism of Western countries and to contrast what they termed the USSR's peacefulness with the warmongering of the West. On 29 November Nehru stated in a public speech that making comparisons between one country and another was not good, and that in any case the comparison should not be made in a hostile spirit. He added that the challenge and menace of the atom bomb cannot be met by another atom bomb.



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On the same day, the Hindustan Times, semiofficial mouthpiece of the Indian government and the Congress Party, put the case more bluntly by suggesting that the USSR should destroy all stocks of atomic weapons as testimony to its professed wish for peace.

It stated, "Even bomb tests are not without dire peril to the world." The paper also said, "Official circles in Britain and America misread the positions in suggesting that the Indians have surrendered their political thinking and that the welcome accorded the Soviet leaders is the measure of their endorsement of Communist ideology. On the contrary, the visit of Soviet leaders to foreign countries may also have its effects on Soviet thinking, which has hitherto

been conditioned by narrow isolationism."

Burma

The Burmese government is going all-out to prepare a lavish reception for the Soviet leaders. Their crowded schedule will include extensive traveling upcountry by air, motor vehicle, and river boat into areas where Burmese Communist rebels have been active.

Both the Burmese government and people are likely to be receptive to the kind of approach Bulganin and Khrushchev used in India. The government is grateful to the Sino-Soviet bloc for taking large quantities of otherwise unsalable rice and will be impressed because the USSR has not attached political strings to its offers of economic aid.

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As a result of Premier Nu's visit to Moscow last month, Burma is committed to accept a Soviet agricultural team whose mission will be to prepare a plan for the diversification of Burma's agriculture.

Agreements to accept other teams of Soviet technicians will probably result from the visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev, thus possibly precluding an IBRD program now being considered. Moscow's announcement last week regarding Burma's first purchases of manufactured goods under the Soviet-Burmese barter agreement included a suggestion that negotiations for the pur-

chase of entire Soviet industrial installations may also be initiated.

There are strong indications that the insurgent Burma Communist Party will soon call off its rebellion and accept liberal government terms which would permit it to operate legally.

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The end of the Communist rebellion would remove the most immediate obstacle to even closer relations between Burma and the bloc.

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FRENCH ELECTION CRISIS

Before French president Coty acts on the Faure cabinet's decision to dissolve the National Assembly, the premier's opponents will make a desperate effort to revise the electoral law. They may also try to oust him by a motion of censure in order to prevent his heading a caretaker government. President Coty may delay announcement of dissolution in order to avoid elections until after the holiday season. If elections are held under the present law, the Communists will probably strengthen their representation in the assembly.

The Faure cabinet decided to dissolve the assembly following its defeat on 29 November on a confidence motion to advance the assembly elections to February. Since Mendes-France was overthrown by an absolute majority in February 1955, dissolution was possible under the constitutional provision giving the cabinet such power if two

governments are overthrown within an 18-month period. The constitution calls for elections to take place within 20 to 30 days of the official announcement of dissolution, but because of the holidays, 8 January will probably be decided on. The Faure cabinet remains in a caretaker status.

The Mendes-France forces are reported making a last-ditch effort to turn the tables on the premier. The Radical Socialists, who have ousted Faure from the party, and the Socialists are trying to ram through legislation to change the electoral law to reduce re-election chances of Faure's supporters. This would be some form of the single-deputy district favored by Mendes-France.

If Faure's original plan survives, the 1951 single-ballot electoral system will

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apply. This provides for party lists in each department and permits parties to affiliate so that their votes may be counted as a unit. Any party slate or affiliated slate that receives a majority of the votes cast gets all the seats in the department. Otherwise, the seats are allotted by proportional representation.

The 1951 law was originally designed to cut into Communist and extreme right representation. The Communists may now profit from it, however, because dissension among the center parties will probably reduce affiliations of these

groups. Furthermore, some Socialists will probably agree to affiliate with the Communists.

Election issues will vary in each department. Mendes-France will try to pledge left-center candidates to support him in the new assembly. His quick move to force the resignation of the Radical Socialist ministers in Faure's cabinet is an effort to dissociate his following from the parties he will campaign against. He probably hopes to make a national issue of the dissolution maneuver which blocked his attempt to stretch the campaign period.

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EAST GERMANY ASSERTS
SOVEREIGNTY OVER EAST BERLIN

East Germany has used its detention of several American officials for driving a radio-telephone equipped car in East Berlin as the occasion to assert its sovereignty over East Berlin and has indicated that it intends to restrict Allied access to this part of the divided city. The assertion on 29 November by General Dibrova, the Soviet commandant in Berlin, that East Berlin is a integral part of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) may put an end for all practical purposes to the exercise by the Western allies of their quadripartite rights in East Berlin.

Dibrova's assertion opens the way to the GDR to interfere with Allied travel in East Berlin to the same extent it is prepared to do so within East Germany and provides the opportunity to attempt to force Britain, France and the United States to deal directly with authorities of the German Democratic Republic. A state-

ment on 30 November by Bruno Baum, East German party leader, that Allied vehicles would no longer be permitted to wander about in East Berlin suggests that restrictions on Allied movements in the Soviet sector are contemplated.

For the past six months, the East Germans have frequently complained about the "espionage centers" maintained by the Western powers in West Berlin and have threatened that countermeasures might have to be taken that would bring hardships to the West Berlin people. These threats, usually issued by top-level East German leaders, were probably made as justification for the restriction of movement into and out of the city. The GDR has taken various measures to prevent its subjects from entering West Berlin, and now that it has asserted sovereignty over East Berlin, stricter controls at the East-West Berlin boundary can be expected.

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While Dibrova is said to have claimed that the transfer of authority over East Berlin to the East German regime had occurred during Foreign Minister Molotov's stop in Berlin on the way home from the Geneva foreign ministers' conference, the only published basis for East German authority within the city is the letters exchanged at the time of the Soviet-East German treaty of 20 September which said that East Germany would "exercise guard control functions" along the zonal and sector borders

and in Berlin. East German propaganda during the past few days has asserted that the adherence of West Germany to NATO constitutes a violation, and therefore abrogation, of quadripartite agreements on Germany.

GDR ministries have gradually assumed covert supervision of the various departments of the East Berlin government, a process which began during the summer of 1954.

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THE SITUATION ON CYPRUS

The intensified violence on Cyprus which followed London's declaration of a state of emergency in the colony on 26 November underscores the determination of Nationalist extremists to continue their campaign until Britain offers an explicit concession on self-determination. The terrorist organization ECKA on 25 November issued a call for "retribution in blood" for the vigorous British campaign of repression, and Archbishop Makarios indicated to the American consul in Nicosia he believed London would soon be forced to give Cyprus an unconditional guarantee of self-determination.

Makarios, threatened with repudiation by the Nationalists if he compromises, rejected on 21 November the latest British formula for a provisional settlement of the issue. Although the formula and Makarios' rejection have not been publicly announced, both appear to be common knowledge on Cyprus.

Greek prime minister Karamanlis has been trying to shelve the issue for the time being

to minimize its influence on the forthcoming election campaign in Greece. In his answer to the British proposal on 28 November, he acknowledged that it represented progress and urged London to encourage "clarifying" talks between Makarios and British governor Harding on Cyprus.

The Karamanlis government apparently hopes that such discussions would continue until after the Greek elections in February. Karamanlis and his foreign minister seem to believe, however, that London, having finally accepted the principle of ultimate self-determination for Cyprus, can eventually be persuaded to agree to a compromise acceptable to the Cypriot Nationalists and to Greek public opinion. Karamanlis has suggested that the British present their proposal to Makarios again as a basis for negotiation rather than as a take-it-or-leave-it proposition.

There is no indication that London will go along with this

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suggestion, and Athens' influence on Makarios is extremely limited at present. Violence therefore is likely to increase on Cyprus in the immediate

future, although the approximately 15,000 British police and military forces on the island can probably prevent full-scale guerrilla warfare.

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ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION

Charges and countercharges of border violations have been made by Israel, Egypt and Jordan during the past week. The clashes have been minor, but the accumulation of incidents could result in an Israeli reprisal raid against either Egypt or Jordan.

Israel is particularly concerned over terrorist operations from Jordan, which Tel Aviv believes are being directed by the Egyptians. Egyptian prime minister Nasr has emphatically denied that Egypt is directing these attacks despite confirmations by UN mediator General Burns and by General Glubb, commander in chief of the Jordanian Arab Legion. Nasr admitted awareness of an organization which conducts such operations, but said he felt these activities were either spontaneous or were organized by the ex-Grand Mufti of Jerusalem.

General Glubb has told the American ambassador that the Arab Legion is planning to take additional steps to control the Jordanian-Israeli border and apprehend Arab infiltrators. Possibly referring specifically to the Egyptian military attaché, he indicated these measures would probably restrict movements of foreign attachés and would include a curfew in certain zones.

Glubb believes Cairo may be trying to create sufficient dissatisfaction in Jordan with British leadership of the Arab Legion to bring about its withdrawal.

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It is unlikely that Nasr believes his growing prestige in the area would permit him to gain significant influence in British-dominated Jordan. He is, however, continuing to solidify his influence in Syria. The Egyptian minister of war, who is also commander of the Egyptian-Syrian military forces, is in Syria to organize a joint military command "capable of striking down any full-scale Israeli aggression against either country." Some Egyptian jet planes reportedly accompanied him and will participate in training exercises with the Syrian air force.

Little progress has been made by General Burns in obtaining Egyptian and Israeli agreement to the UN peace proposals for the El Auja demilitarized zone. UN truce officials feel that neither Egypt nor Israel is willing to accept the UN plan, but that each state is hoping to make the other responsible for rejecting it.

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Israel again appears to be trying to reduce the usefulness of the UN machinery in easing the tense border situation. According to UN observers, Israel is "piling up complaints" with the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission but is not asking for investigations of most of the incidents. Since the Mixed Armistice Commission investigates border incidents only when requested, Israel evidently intends to use the list of "complaints" for political purposes rather than for seeking a bona fide investigation of the incident.

Delivery of Soviet bloc arms to Egypt apparently has continued with the arrival of the Soviet vessel Krasnodar in

Alexandria

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King Saud of Saudi Arabia has denied reports that his government has concluded an arms deal with the Soviet bloc. Saud, reiterating professions of friendship for the United States, maintained that these reports were inspired by the British in an attempt to discourage American agreement to his requests for arms and diplomatic support.

AFGHANISTAN

Prime Minister Daud is consolidating his position in Afghanistan, and his efforts to orient Afghan policy toward closer relations with the USSR are continuing. The Afghan government, however, apparently is still willing to let the American construction firm of Morrison-Knudsen carry on its large-scale project, provided the firm can either guarantee passage of its supplies through Afghanistan or can route them through Iran.

The resignation of anti-Soviet General Arif, minister of national defense, suggests that the royal family is now accepting Daud's leadership. Arif, a protégé of King Zahir Shah, has frequently been an opponent of Daud in the past. Rumors are current in Kabul that three other generally pro-

Western cabinet ministers will also be removed shortly.

Daud's temporary assumption of the Defense Ministry is apt to result in closer military ties with the Soviet bloc and intensified border pressure on Pakistan.

A tentative proposal for talks put forward by Pakistani governor general Iskander Mirza on 26 November met with a cool response in Afghanistan. The Afghan foreign minister approved the idea but stated Afghanistan's views were already well known.

Sardar Najibullah, Afghan ambassador to London and a rabid exponent of an independent Push-toonistan, has been called home, apparently to participate in the welcome for Bulganin and Khrushchev when they visit Kabul on 14 December.

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PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTSFrench North Africa

Morocco: Terrorism has diminished somewhat as a result of the efforts of the nationalist Istiqlal party to maintain order. However, Berber tribes are again making forays in the vicinity of the Spanish Moroccan border.

French public claims that the tribes are led by a Moroccan noncommissioned officer, who had been held prisoner for several months in 1954 by the Viet Minh and who is currently basing his operations in Spanish Morocco, seem certain to revive French-Spanish antagonism. This friction will be intensified by the inflammatory speech delivered in Tetuan on 27 November by the exiled Istiqlal fanatic, Allal el Fassi, who declared that the tribal rebellion would be enlarged and would continue until both Morocco and Algeria had won complete independence.

Sultan Mohamed ben Youssef has requested his close adviser Si Bekkai to form the first representative Moroccan government. Rivalry between the Istiqlal party and the less-important nationalist Shoura party is complicating Bekkai's task as officials in the French residency general have been building up the Shoura at the expense of the Istiqlal party. Other pressures as well as this controversy may delay formation of the cabinet, particularly since neither the sultan nor Bekkai seems willing to jeopardize his political future at this juncture by making any controversial decision.

A high French Foreign Ministry official has informed the American embassy in Paris that,

contrary to earlier statements that negotiations with the Moroccans could not begin until after the French elections, the French government is preparing to negotiate with the Moroccans now. This apparent reversal may indicate a desire by Paris to place the onus for any prolonged delay in undertaking negotiations squarely on the Moroccans.

Algeria: The Department of Constantine, where sporadic rebel attacks are concentrated, is suffering from a severe economic depression. No estimate of the value of property destroyed is possible, but fear and pessimism have caused many small businessmen to attempt to liquidate their holdings.

The French government has indicated it will not negotiate with the Algerian rebels, but an increasing number of moderate and formerly pro-French Algerian Moslems and some prominent French settlers are reported urging a negotiated settlement. They believe that the amnesty accorded Tunisian rebels who surrendered last December might serve as a useful precedent in achieving an equally successful cease-fire in Algeria.

Tunisia: The activities of extremist nationalist Salah ben Youssef pose a serious problem for the ten-week-old government of Premier Tahar ben Amar, already beset with the difficulties of putting into effect the French-Tunisian conventions granting limited autonomy. Ben Youssef was ousted as secretary general of the nationalist Neo-Destour party on 8 October because he openly advocated repudiation of the conventions.

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He is now seeking to discredit Neo-Destour president Habib Bourghiba, whose conciliatory attitude made agreement possible.

Bourghiba won an initial victory over Ben Youssef when the Neo-Destour party congress on 15 November unanimously endorsed collaboration with France within the framework of the conventions. However, Ben Youssef's views appeal to important factions of Bourghiba's present following. Should the government fail, for instance, to remedy the unemployment crisis, many units of the pro-nationalist Tunisian General Federation of Labor and former members of the fellagha may transfer their allegiance to Ben Youssef.

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Indonesians to Elect
Constituent Assembly

The Indonesians on 15 December will elect 520 delegates to a constituent assembly which will draft a permanent constitution to supersede the present provisional instrument. The show of party strengths in the elections is not likely to differ much from that of the parliamentary elections last September, which resulted in the four major parties each drawing from 20 to 25 percent of the vote.

The current trend in Indonesian politics suggests that the delegates to the constituent assembly are likely to be divided between a loose coalition of the pro-West Moslem Masjumi and various minor parties on the one hand, and the National Party (PNI)--supported by the Communists and fellow travelers--on the other. The balance of power will be held

by the Moslem Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), whose only discernible objective is to promote Islam. The Masjumi and its allies are likely to be in the minority, but there are indications that the NU slightly favors them.

Many of the chief issues with which the constituent assembly must deal are becoming more clearly defined as public interest in the campaign is increasing. The most widely discussed issue is the degree of Islamic influence in the government. The NU probably will be the chief advocate of such influence and will probably seek to trade concessions on this matter. The Moslem Masjumi, anxious to obtain NU support for it to head the government, is vulnerable to such overtures. It is unlikely, however, that sufficient votes can be mustered to do more than

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give special recognition to Islam in the constitution as the religion of most Indonesians.

Another important issue is federalism versus centralism. The PNI and the Communists, whose strength is concentrated in Java, favor a highly centralized government with a strong executive and a unicameral legislature. The Masjumi, minority groups, and non-Moslem religious parties, on the other hand, have their support primarily in the outer islands. They, therefore, favor a considerable degree of

local autonomy. Moreover, they are anxious to establish effective checks on the executive and want a bicameral legislature in which regional representation would be given more than its proportionate weight.

In view of the various factors mentioned above, it is almost certain that the work of the constituent assembly will be prolonged. Moreover, the constitution it drafts will probably be an unwieldy compromise.

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Viet Minh Food Problem

For the past three crop seasons, agricultural yields in North Vietnam have been well below those anticipated by the government, and recent statements by the Viet Minh indicate that grain production for 1955 will fall considerably short of standing requirements.

Early in 1955, the Viet Minh government began a major effort to make the fall harvest a success, emphasizing that economic recovery hinged on overfulfillment of agricultural goals. An unprecedented series of natural calamities during the summer and fall--including a cattle disease epidemic, a drought, floods, and a typhoon--upset these plans. As a result, North Vietnam's normal yearly rice shortage of approximately 200,000 metric tons will be even greater this year.

Open references have been made this fall to "peasants in

difficulty," and, for their relief, Hanoi instituted tax amendments and revised rice rationing quotas downward. A National Planning Board was created for handling critical economic problems--meaning agriculture.

There was a substantial increase in Chinese and Soviet rice deliveries to North Vietnam scheduled for the last three months of 1955. While probably only a modest amount of bloc aid rice was originally scheduled for delivery this year, more than 70,000 tons have already arrived in Haiphong.

The food shortage is likely to become even more acute during the first few months of 1956, prior to the spring harvest, and the Viet Minh will then require additional assistance from Communist China and the USSR. [] (Prepared by ORR)

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Yugoslav-Satellite Relations
Show Improvement

Relations between Yugoslavia and the European Satellites have shown a steady improvement since Khrushchev's Belgrade visit last May, but they are still not as cordial as those between Yugoslavia and the USSR. There are long-standing obstacles to the restoration of close rapport.

The improved relations have for the most part been manifested by exchanges of delegations, settlement of some long-standing border disputes, and conclusion of agreements to facilitate political and economic exchanges. The initiative for most of these developments has come from the Satellites.

The exchange of delegations between Yugoslavia and the Satellites is gradually expanding both in number and types. These delegations customarily return home with praise for their hosts. Albania and East Germany, however, have lagged in this regard, possibly because the Albanians remember too clearly the Yugoslav hegemony over them before 1948 and the East German regime has not been recognized by Belgrade.

The Yugoslavs have concluded postal and telegraph conventions with Bulgaria and Rumania, and have agreed to exchange films and promote tourism with all of the Satellites except Albania. Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland have recently signed air agreements with Yugoslavia.

In its first accord with a Satellite covering 1956 trade, Yugoslavia signed a protocol with Poland last week calling for trade totaling \$14,000,000 each way. This figure is nearly double the level of trade called for in 1955. Despite these developments, there remain several

serious sore spots in Yugoslav-Satellite relations.

Belgrade has reacted with considerable rancor to Hungary's refusal to meet the Yugoslav estimate of its World War II reparation obligations or to pay for damages to the Yugoslav economy resulting from Hungary's failure to fulfill trade contracts after 1948. Negotiations on these claims were started in September but were later broken off. Two developments suggest, however, that the impasse may be resolved. On 15 November a Yugoslav-Hungarian railroad agreement was concluded, and Hungarian premier Hegedus expressed hope that the financial questions might be resolved.

Another sore spot in Yugoslav-Satellite relations has been Rumania's treatment of its Serbian minority. The Yugoslavs stress that this question will not be resolved satisfactorily until the numerous Serbians deported by the Rumanian government in 1948 are returned to their homes and their property restored.

Yugoslav efforts to improve relations with the Satellites are apparently still motivated by the desire to encourage the development of regimes independent of Moscow. Belgrade believes the ties between the Satellites and the USSR are lessening. However, President Tito declared to Secretary Dulles that the Satellite leaders are still "mentally Stalinist."

Distrust of continued Stalinism in the Satellites will undoubtedly dampen Yugoslav enthusiasm for better relations with them. While the Yugoslavs claim they are not seeking the scalps of such leaders as Rakosi, Chervenkov, Shehu, and others closely associated with the 1948 break,

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They apparently hope Yugoslav influence will bring about a liberalization of Satellite policies and a weakening of Satellite ties with the USSR. Such changes would make it difficult

for the Satellite leaders mentioned to retain power, and cognizance on their part of these Yugoslav aims will probably also act as an impediment to close relations with Yugoslavia. []

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East German Security Service
Reorganized

The recently announced reorganization of the East German security service was probably undertaken to strengthen the control apparatus in the face of increased unrest and dissidence. With the Soviet turnover to East Germany of border and internal control functions, the responsibilities of the security service have been greatly increased.



ERNST WOLLWEBER

Council of Ministers to handle security matters. They did this apparently in order to reduce the powers of the security chief and to reassure the populace against a resurgence of the oppressive Stalinist methods of policy control.

Now, however, the East German leaders apparently consider that the need to take effective measures to curb unrest and stem the unusually high flow of refugees to the West outweighs the risks inherent in concentrating great power in the security chief's hands.

The reorganization, announced by the East German government on 24 November, removed the State Secretariat for State Security from the Ministry of Interior and made it an independent ministry, as it was prior to June 1953. During the past two years, 10,000 uniformed internal troops have been added and the new ministry probably also controls the 25,000-man border guard.

The establishment of a full-fledged Ministry for State Security departs from the example set by the USSR following Stalin's death. The USSR and Poland have set up committees responsible directly to the

For several months there has been an increase in overt police oppression and determined efforts on the part of the government's various control agencies to prevent the alarmingly high rate of defection to the West of military-age refugees.

The East German regime probably feels the need to show the mailed fist by strengthening the apparatus of the security police. As an additional measure, it installed as head of the

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new ministry Ernst Wollweber a long-time Communist sabotage and subversion expert who has a reputation for brutality and suppression. By vesting increased authority in Wollweber the regime probably hopes to

avoid problems arising from personal ambition, since unlike former security minister Zaisser, he is believed to be a reliable technician without aspirations for political control. 25X1

Brazil

The regime of Acting President Nereu Ramos, brought to power in War Minister Lott's "preventive coup" of 11 November, appears stable and primarily concerned with avoiding further cleavage in the armed forces and ensuring the inauguration in January of President-elect Juscelino Kubitschek.

The state-of-siege powers granted the administration by Congress as of 25 November have thus far been used with obvious restraint. This supports the belief that these powers were requested and granted primarily to prevent President Café Filho's return to office from the leave of absence he took following a heart attack in early November.

The Communists, after some initial hesitancy, decided to support the state of siege as a necessary measure to ensure the inauguration of Kubitschek and Vice President-elect Joao Goulart, for whom they had actively campaigned. There are indications that the government is embarrassed by the Communists' support, and various Communist demonstrations seeking to make capital out of this support have been broken up by the police. Furthermore, the government gave more than usual attention to the 27 November anniversary of the suppression of the abortive 1935 Communist uprising; special ceremonies honoring the members of the armed forces killed in that revolt were attended by Ramos, his entire cabinet, and other high officials.

At the same time, however, the Communists may profit from some of the cabinet appointments made by Ramos. His labor minister, Nelson Omega, vigorously denies having Communist sympathies, but has in the past been a signer of Communist "appeals."

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PART III

PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVESSOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE

The over-all pattern of the Khrushchev-Bulganin foreign policy which has been unfolding since last spring was brought into clearer perspective by the Soviet delegation's presentation of the USSR's case at the Geneva foreign ministers' conference.

Soviet foreign policy at this juncture suggests that Moscow will continue to follow the basic post-Stalin policy of seeking at least a limited detente between the USSR and the Western powers. The Soviet leaders, however, appear to conceive of this policy primarily as a device for reducing international tension rather than an instrument for an early negotiated settlement of the basic political issues dividing the power blocs.

The Soviet leaders apparently believe that they hold the initiative in the political-diplomatic duel with the West which they envisage as continuing indefinitely against the background of the tacit agreement reached at the summit conference that, confronted by a relative balance of nuclear power, neither the USSR nor the United States can afford to resort to general war as an instrument of policy. The Russians appear confident that this situation has deprived the West of any possibility of negotiating from strength and any hope of imposing on the Sino-Soviet bloc a settlement of the cold war on Western terms.

Within this context, Soviet foreign policy will remain focused on detaching West Germany from the Atlantic alliance and ultimately bringing about the withdrawal of American military power and political influence from the Eurasian continent. Russia's bold intervention in

the Middle East reflects the belief that the strategic stalemate has opened new opportunities for challenging the West's position and influence in the vast area stretching from Morocco to Indonesia.

The Soviet leaders believe, moreover, that their carefully planned series of initiatives launched last spring has removed the sense of urgency in the Western world on the importance of high rates of defense spending and incorporating a reunified and rearmed Germany in the Atlantic alliance. Moscow has relied heavily on such dramatic unilateral actions as the policy reversal on Austria, the Bulganin-Khrushchev missions to Belgrade and South Asia, the announcement that Soviet forces would be reduced by 640,000, and the return of the Porkkala naval base to Finland. Further moves timed to maintain the momentum of the detente policy can be expected and may include the withdrawal of some Soviet forces from East Germany and the European Satellites.

The Russians appear to be well satisfied with the progress of their campaign to convince the non-Communist world that the threat of Soviet military aggression has evaporated, and there have been no signs that the results of the Geneva foreign ministers' conference may lead them to reappraise, much less abandon, this line. Molotov arrived at Geneva confident that he would be under no compulsion to make any significant concessions to Western terms on any of the questions on the conference agenda. Khrushchev and Bulganin have seized every opportunity on their tour of India to stress their devotion to "peaceful coexistence" and the peaceful solution of all international problems by negotiation.

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Moscow's European Policy

The Russians are engaged in what is essentially a "holding operation" in Europe, based on the belief that the maintenance of the division of Germany will in the long run work to their advantage. They anticipate that their detente policy will diminish interest in Western Europe, particularly in France, in bringing a reunified and rearmed Germany into NATO and that it will strengthen general consent to a stabilization of the present European situation under security guarantees based on a divided Germany.

Soviet policy is aimed at undermining popular support of the present Western position that the creation of a European security system is impossible without prior agreement to reunify Germany. Molotov's attempt at Geneva to secure four-power endorsement of six general principles of European security which the American representative had earlier cited as common to the proposals made by both the USSR and the West was designed to stimulate interest in some form of security plan to precede any reunification of Germany.

Soviet Policy on Germany

Moscow's German policy appears to be based on the assumptions that continued division will generate increasing restiveness and frustration in Western Germany which will be directed against the Adenauer government and the Western powers for the failure to make progress toward reunification, and that the demand will grow for West Germany to be released from its NATO obligations and to take the reunification problem into its own hands.

Molotov's principal objective at the Geneva conference was to underscore in strongest

possible terms Soviet warnings over the past year that West German entry into NATO and WEU would destroy all possibility of a Big Four agreement on reunification. He did not attempt to conceal the sharp divergence between the Soviet and Western approaches to the German question. On the contrary, his forceful restatement of Bulganin's summit position was intended to remove any hope, particularly among the West German public, that the USSR would eventually accept reunification on Western terms.

Speaking directly to the Germans, he stated bluntly that there are only two courses open to Germany: becoming "a militarist state integrated in the military grouping formed by the Western powers;" or "a peaceful and democratic state standing outside any military blocs and co-operating with other states in the consolidation of peace." Moscow will take this second alternative as the keynote of its future German policy and will do all in its power to encourage the West Germans to believe that an "alliance-free" reunified Germany would gain profitable rewards in terms of restored power and prestige as a fulcrum of the East-West balance of power.

The Russians have abandoned the pretense of serious interest in negotiating a settlement with the Western powers which would provide for the creation of an all-German government through free elections and have embarked on an all-out effort to win the allegiance of the German people. They have sought to place the problem in an entirely new context by a "two Germanies" policy designed to further solidify the division of Germany. The 20 September treaty according "complete sovereignty" to the East German government was part of the plan to elevate the "German Democratic Republic" to the same

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international status that the West German Federal Republic enjoys in the Western world.

Molotov repeatedly stressed at Geneva that the solution of the German problem was a matter for the German people themselves. He expressed confidence that it was only a matter of time until the West Germans established official contacts with the East German regime. He referred to West German Social Democratic leader Ollenhauer's call for the development of "technical contacts" between East and West Germany and predicted that if the need for such contacts is not recognized today, "it will be recognized tomorrow."

While Moscow has recently avoided public references to the term "neutralization," probably because the West German Social Democrats have disavowed a settlement based on such an arrangement, it clearly expects that the Austrian precedent will exert a growing influence on German thinking. The Soviet chargé in Vienna recently dropped a hint to an Austrian official, which he presumably expected to be relayed to Bonn, that Molotov's position on Germany at Geneva was not necessarily final and that a solution along the lines of the Austrian settlement might be possible.

The forthcoming establishment of a Soviet embassy in Bonn will enable the Russians to make contact with those Germans who have always opposed Adenauer's Western alignment and who believe that if their country is to be reunified, a

price must be paid and that the price can only be neutralization. Moscow is counting heavily on a sharp reorientation in German sentiment and on the growing political power of these Germans.

Future Big Four Conferences

The USSR probably prefers to stand on its Geneva positions indefinitely and does not seem to desire another Big Four conference in the near future. Molotov failed to take advantage of the opportunity at Geneva to press for setting a definite date for the next meeting and acquiesced in the final communiqué's non-committal recommendation that "the future course of the discussions of the foreign ministers should be settled through diplomatic channels."

The timing of another Big Four conference and possible changes in the Western position are questions of great importance in determining the outcome of Moscow's German gamble.

Soviet policy on Germany seems to be based on the assumption that there will be no major changes in the Western position on Germany and European security before the American elections. Soviet leaders also probably calculate that the Western powers will not do anything which might jeopardize Chancellor Adenauer's prospects in the West German Bundestag elections in the fall of 1957.

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Moscow may therefore be counting on having two years to press its campaign to win the allegiance of the German people to a policy of neutralization and probably believes the 1957 elections will be the crucial test which will determine whether Bonn will continue along past foreign policy lines or follow the neutral course desired by the Soviet Union.

While the Russians may hope to avoid further discussions on Germany in the near future, their long-term detente strategy requires that they avoid giving the Western powers an opportunity to argue that West German rearmament in NATO is inescapable because the two Geneva conferences have demonstrated that the USSR is unwilling to agree to German reunification under any conditions. Moscow also realizes that if it allows itself to be maneuvered into a position of appearing responsible for the collapse of the East-West conversations initiated at the summit conference, the arguments of West German and West European opponents of German rearmament and integration would be discredited.

The ultimate success of the USSR's European policy in great measure depends on strengthening the influence of political forces and sentiments of the kind implicit in Jules Moch's recent statement that the reduction in Soviet armed forces and the strategic revolution brought about by nuclear weapons make West Germany's 12 divisions unnecessary. The Soviet leaders will therefore almost certainly continue to press their campaign for a European security system, for a relaxation in tensions, and for a "moral and political condemnation" of the use of atomic weapons.

In addition to pressing this theme, Moscow will be

careful to keep its lines open to Germany's European neighbors in order to take full advantage of the alarm and hesitation it anticipates will flow from any trends in West Germany toward narrow nationalism and an extremist climate of opinion.

Soviet Disarmament Policy

While the foreign ministers' discussion on disarmament failed to advance beyond the decisions of the UN Disarmament Subcommittee meetings last September, Molotov made a greater effort to record a measure of agreement on this subject than on either of the other two items on the Geneva agenda. This is an indication of the great importance the Russians attach to their disarmament policy as a key element in their broader detente strategy.

The Russians apparently believe their 10 May proposals have given them a strong initiative which they can maintain indefinitely, supported by demands for an immediate "moral and political condemnation" of atomic weapons.

The record of disarmament discussions to date, however, suggests that the Soviet leaders believe security against Western military power and insurance against a surprise attack are to be achieved not by a formal enforceable disarmament agreement with the West but rather by the deterrent power of a strong nuclear capability reinforced by a subtle and flexible diplomacy. This is expected to lead the Western governments, on their own volition, to curtail military spending and reduce armed forces.

Middle East Policy

The two principal aims of the Russian intervention in the Middle East are to block the extension southward of the Western-sponsored "northern tier"

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defense structure and to encourage the emergence of a neutral bloc of Middle Eastern states. This would entail the elimination of traditional Western political influence and of Western control of the area's oil resources.

The timing of Moscow's intervention seems to have been determined by the convergence last spring of two different lines of development--the failure of the Russians to prevent the entry of West Germany into NATO and a series of events in the Middle East which offered opportunities for exploitation.

The defeat of the Russians' five-year campaign to bloc the entry of a sovereign and rearmed West Germany into NATO placed the Soviet leaders in urgent need of a quick "prestige success." Their search for an opportunity to mount a counteroffensive against the West immediately focused on the situation in the Middle East, which had been brought to a new crisis by two events in February 1955. The first was the sharp aggravation of historical and dynastic rivalries in the Arab world produced by Iraq's adherence to the Turkish-Pakistani pact on 24 February. The second was the threat to Colonel Nasr's leadership of the Egyptian revolutionary regime produced by the Israeli attack on Egyptian forces in the Gaza area on 28 February.

In all of its overtures to Middle Eastern states, Moscow has endeavored to portray itself as the champion of Middle Eastern nationalism and independence. It seeks to demonstrate that neutralism is the best policy for these states and that arms and economic assistance can be obtained from the Soviet bloc on easy terms and in amounts more generous than from the West, and without the necessity of assuming the kind of political and military commitments the

Western governments require.

The pattern of Soviet intervention suggests that Moscow's purpose is to confront the Western powers with an inescapable choice between (1) continuing to promote a system of Middle East defense pacts at the cost of an arms race which will force the Western powers into ever-increasing support of Israel and which may result in a local war with disastrous consequences for the Western position in the Middle East; and (2) agreeing to a neutralization of the area guaranteed by both the USSR and the West.

The Russians probably calculate they will benefit from either alternative. An agreement guaranteeing the neutrality of the area would place the Soviet Union in a position of equality with the Western powers. An unrestricted arms race, on the other hand, would force the United States in the direction of increasing military and political support of Israel, which would cause irreparable damage to the American position throughout the Arab world.

At the same time, an arms race would generate friction between the United States and the British and French governments, which would attempt to preserve their traditional ties with the Arab states. Should this situation result in open warfare between the Arabs and the Israelis, the USSR would be in a position to offer itself as a mediator and as a guarantor of any settlement.

The USSR has hinted that it would welcome the reopening of the Palestine question in the United Nations. It would almost certainly lend full support to the Arabs and encourage them to adopt an uncompromising position regarding partition lines, refugees, and Jerusalem, based on the 1947 UN resolutions.

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Soviet bloc offers of arms and support of Arab claims against Israel constitute only part of a more dangerous long-term Soviet offensive directed at the underdeveloped countries from North Africa to Indonesia. The scope of this offensive was indicated in October by the Soviet ambassador in Cairo. He said, "We will send economic missions, scientific missions, agricultural missions...and any other kind of mission you can imagine that will help these countries."

The USSR's trade with the Near and Middle East increased by 28 percent during the first six months of 1955 compared to the first six months of 1954.

Soviet Policy in the Far East

Moscow's intensified activities in the Middle East and South Asia probably will be followed by increased attention to Far Eastern problems.

The USSR is committed to achieving a great-power status for Communist China and, accordingly, has given full support to Chinese Communist efforts to extend negotiations with the United States. While the Russians are unlikely to urge the Chinese Communists to launch any major military operations in the Taiwan area in the near future, they may encourage probing actions for the purpose

of achieving purely political ends by bringing pressure to bear on the United States. The USSR has also supported Peiping's call for a conference on Far Eastern problems, to be attended by all Pacific powers, including the United States.

The USSR has not aggressively championed Viet Minh insistence on full implementation of the Vietnam election provisions of the Geneva agreements.

Moscow's decision to vote for Japan's admission to the United Nations even before the conclusion of a treaty ending the legal state of war between the two countries suggests that the Soviet negotiators desire an early conclusion of the London talks with the Japanese. They may propose a settlement of the prisoner of war question in exchange for the establishment of diplomatic relations along the lines of the agreement on the release of German prisoners.

Moscow probably believes that there is a good chance that neutralism can be encouraged in Japan, especially by taking advantage of Japanese desires to establish closer economic ties with Communist China and to reduce the number of American military personnel in Japan. [REDACTED]

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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SUDAN

There is no longer much doubt that the Sudan will choose independence rather than union with Egypt, but the precise machinery through which the Sudanese will make their


choice has not been finally decided. Sudanese politicians, meanwhile, have begun to jockey for position, with Prime Minister Azhari striving to maintain a hold on his post.

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The Self-Determination Process

On 16 August, following the announcement that the "Sudanization" of the Sudan civil service had been completed, the Sudanese parliament asked Britain and Egypt, the two powers in whose name the Sudan has been governed since 1899, to put in motion the "arrangements for self-determination" envisaged by the 1953 Anglo-Egyptian agreement. These arrangements involved the "Sudanization" of the Sudan civil service, withdrawal of British and Egyptian forces--accomplished by 10 November--and the establishment of an international commission to supervise election of a Sudanese constituent assembly. This

assembly is to decide the Sudan's future status and draw up a new constitution.

At the time of the 16 August request, Egypt's policy toward the Sudan was still being directed by Salah Salim, the "dancing major." Salim had carried on a violent campaign of propaganda and subversion against the Sudanese cabinet headed by Ismail al-Azhari, who switched from a pro-Egyptian to a pro-independence stand last spring.

To provide safeguards against Egyptian influence, as well as to "short cut" the self-determination process, Azhari,

first secured parliamentary approval for the exclusion of both Egypt and Britain from the international commission. Subsequently, on 29 August, the Sudanese parliament also resolved that the best method of deciding the country's future status was a plebiscite, which Egypt presumably would find less easy to influence than an assembly.

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These developments, spelling a defeat for Egypt's policy, were the occasion for Salah Salim's forced resignation from the Egyptian Revolutionary Command Council at the end of August. Egypt's policy since then has been one of accommodation to the inevitability of Sudanese independence.

The Anglo-Egyptian agreement must be amended, however, if a plebiscite is to be held. After prolonged negotiations Cairo and London agreed on 29 November on a plebiscite and on the scope and functions of the international supervisory commission. While there is no definite timetable, the Sudan should formally achieve independence by the end of 1956.

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Sudanese Politics

With the basic decision on their country's future out of the way, Sudanese politicians recently have devoted more attention to their personal prospects. Sudanese politics are still based essentially on two rival Moslem sects: the Khatmia, led by Sayyid al-Mirghani, and the heterodox Ansar, led by the Sayyid al-Mahdi. The Khatmia has enjoyed Egyptian favor, and its members make up the bulk of the supporters of Prime Minister Azhari's National Unionist Party (NUP), while the Ansar, more friendly with the British, is represented in the Umma Party.

Both these leading parties now favor independence, but the process by which the NUP arrived at this position was accompanied by splits in its membership and a consequent decline in Azhari's parliamentary strength. Since last April, Azhari has commanded less than half of the 97 seats in the lower house and has had to rely on an assortment of independents and representatives from the pagan south to stay in office.

Moreover, while the NUP is based on the Khatmia sect, Azhari himself is an Ismaili--the sect headed by the Aga Khan. The prime minister seems to have sought to develop an independent center of power based on his control of the government machinery, patronage, and his ability to maneuver in a faction-ridden parliament.

Azhari apparently has been partially successful in this effort. Although his growing independence has antagonized al-Mirghani, the Khatmia leader now apparently feels he needs Azhari as much or more than Azhari needs him. Thus the fall of Azhari's cabinet on 10 November, brought about by the defection of four Khatmia members of the government, and the return of Azhari to office five

days later appear to have been the result of al-Mirghani's reluctance at the last minute to see in power a coalition government which might be even less dependent on Khatmia support and friendlier to his rival, the al-Mahdi, than Azhari has been.

The opposition, led by the al-Mahdi's Umma Party and including former NUP members who compete with Azhari for the ear of al-Mirghani, continues to clamor for a "national"--i.e., coalition--government in which they would share the power and pelf that the prospect of Sudanese independence promises. Even though he has come out on top for the moment, Azhari's future therefore remains very uncertain.

Future Problems

Internal political struggles in the Sudan are almost certain to become more intense after independence. Given the country's over-all problems--its underdeveloped economy, its leaders' lack of administrative experience and the need for building up indigenous security forces to replace British and Egyptian troops--factional fights among politicians will be expensive luxuries. In addition, the Sudan is almost certain to face two specific problems whose dangers are already evident. These problems are the separatist tendencies of the southern Sudan, and Communist activity--native and international.

The first problem took an acute form last August in the mutiny of southern troops against northern officers. While most of the mutineers were rounded up, their temporary success in practically removing the area from government control, except for a few strategic points, illustrates the tenuousness of the hold Khartoum has and is likely to have over the southern provinces for some time to come.

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Patience and continuity of policy would appear to be essential if the southern Sudan with its pagan, primitive population is to overcome its fears that it will be exploited by the relatively advanced Moslems of the northern provinces. The Khartoum government's preoccupation with parliamentary politics, and the seduction of the southern representatives by bribery and offices, is not likely to inspire confidence in the south.

The problem of Communist activity takes two forms. In its local form, this activity has not yet made serious political inroads; only one member of parliament is identified with the crypto-Communist Anti-Imperialist Front. Economically, however, the Communist-controlled Sudanese Workers Trade Union Federation has dominated organized labor since 1950, with a special center in the railway workers union which has posed almost continual strike threats this year.

Internationally, the Soviet bloc has taken unusual interest in the Sudan. Bloc trade missions have visited Khartoum, and the Sudanese cabinet has approved the opening of Soviet and Czech liaison offices. East Germany, Hungary and Poland reportedly have applied for a similar privilege. These offices presumably would become legations after the Sudan achieves independence. An East German mission of eight or nine engineers is believed to be making a water conservation survey in the western Sudan, and there have been unconfirmed reports that Soviet bloc

arms have been offered the Sudan defense force.

Another opportunity for Soviet bloc activity in the Sudan is presented by the composition of the neutral international commission to supervise the self-determination process. The Sudanese parliament named seven nations--Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, India, Pakistan, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia--to the commission. The first three have indicated a lack of enthusiasm for the task but are willing to undertake it.

In view of the closer relations between the Soviet bloc and Egypt since the conclusion of their arms deal, the Czechs, with Egyptian encouragement, are likely to play an active role.

Aside from the usual possibilities for extending its influence in a newly independent state, the Soviet bloc may also see the Sudan as a door opening into central Africa. Sudanese independence will have an impact on neighboring territories, and new trouble, particularly in the southern provinces, would spill over into the Belgian Congo and Uganda. Authorities in both these territories were disturbed by an influx from the Sudan of refugees and fugitive rebels during the mutiny in August.

The size and variety of the Sudan's problems seem much greater than the government's ability to handle them. The foreign intrigues which have troubled the country's progress thus far can be expected to continue.

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